Baseball Notes

I would never pretend to know more than a manager of a Major League Baseball team. I can’t even begin to compare my knowledge to theirs and what they have to learn, memorize, and recall. They have to make in-the-moment judgment calls where I would just stand dumbfounded looking around for someone to tell me what to do all day. Their entire lives revolve around winning a game that you and I use for relaxation and entertainment.

That being said, more and more I see moves made by managers where I think, “What was that!?” Moves that defy baseball logic, defy the numbers, and make little or no sense at all.

One such move happened yesterday, May 2, in the 9th inning of an afternoon Diamondbacks/Dodgers game. I was keeping track of this game in the 9th because it has fantasy implications for me as I own Takashi Saito as a closer. What happened in the top of the 9th just made me scratch my head in amazement. Here is the scenario:

Top of the 9th, Dodger Stadium.
Dodgers lead 2-0 and bring in Saito to close the game.
The number two hitter in the lineup, Conor Jackson, leads off with a single.
Orlando Hudson lays down a sacrifice bunt advancing Jackson to second.
Eric Byrnes singles, scoring Jackson.
Carlos Quentin strikes out swinging.
Stephen Drew strikes out looking.
Dodgers win 2-1.

Does the scenario I just described bother anyone else? Jackson did his job by getting on base and not recording an out. Up next is the number three hitter in the Diamondbacks lineup, Hudson. Through yesterday, Hudson’s line read .348/.412/.500. He has drawn 15 walks, and almost a third of his hits in 2007 have been for extra bases. Hudson is, by far, the best hitter in the Diamondbacks lineup the first month of the season. So, naturally, you place your overall best hitter in the third spot. Do you think Pujols, Ortiz, Berkman, Lee, Mauer, Tejada, Cabrera, or Beltran are asked to bunt in that situation? 100 out of 100 times the answer will be no.

Now, there are two scenarios where I can see this strategy working this late in the game. One would be if there was a man on first and no outs and the pitcher was up to bat, or maybe even your last position player on your bench, but your number three hitter? Second, if the score was 1-0 and they knew they only had to play for one run to extend the game (especially on the road), I can almost see that one working as well. But to be down two, have a man on, and take the bat out of your best hitter’s hands?

Eric Byrnes also did his job at the plate, driving in the run, but with Hudson not getting an opportunity to try and get on base, the D’backs essentially said we are going to try and win this game with Carlos Quentin and Stephen Drew instead of Orlando Hudson and Eric Byrnes. Here is a comparison of the four players:

Which two players would you rather have swinging the bat? Having wasted an out with Hudson’s sacrifice, Quentin or Drew could not bunt Byrnes over to second, as the D’backs would have been down to their final out. So you now must rely on an extra base hit to drive in a run, but your two hitters with the highest slugging percentage and most extra base hits have come and gone. And we haven’t even mentioned that Quentin’s K/AB is .23 while Drew’s is .19 — Saito is averaging 10.43 K/9; not a good combination.

So what would have happened if Hudson was allowed to hit? We will never know. But there might be a way to make an educated guess.

Every year, Baseball Prospectus generates their Run Expectancy Matrix. Essentially, this chart uses game data from each individual season to determine how many runs a team can realistically expect to score in one inning based on each possible situation in that inning (men on second and third, no out; man on first, two outs; etc.). So the run expectancy will differ from year to year based on team offenses, pitching, how parks are playing, etc. Here is the matrix for 2007 through May 2:

From this, you can see that in 2007, a team would expect to score 0.83603 runs with a man on first and no outs and expect to score 0.65729 runs with a man on second and one out. The D’backs sacrificing that man over to second, with their best hitter no less, essentially lessened their chances to score runs, based on the data from the 2007 season so far.

Maybe this is just a fluke year, or a month is not a big enough sample size. Well, here are the run expectancy numbers for this exact situation from the past three years:

From 2004 to 2007 (and actually much farther back than ‘04), it has never been advisable to bunt a runner over in this situation unless you have a unique scenario such as a pitcher must bat. This doesn’t just apply to the ninth inning, but to the entire game. Your traditional baseball knowledge goes out the window here when you back it up with statisitcs. So how can we get these managers to stop using their instincts?

You know the old addage from Earl Weaver just as well as I do:

“You play for one run, that’s all you get.”

And the Diamondbacks needed two.